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OVERVIEW

CHAPTERl

As the nation's largest cash welfare program, Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), is replaced
by state welfare programs funded by federal block
grants, the effects of reforms on the welfareparticipation and labor-supply choices of low-income
individuals remain a topic of considerable interest. This
dissertation uses two different approaches to analyze
the effects of changes in welfare-program benefit
formulas and eligibility lUles on the economic wellbeing of and the choices made by low-income
individuals.

Chapter 1 investigates differences in demographics,
income and poverty, labor supply, and multiple
welfare-program participation among all femaleheaded households, AFDC participants,
nonparticipants, new AFDC entrants, and recentAFDC
exiters, from 1975 to 1987. The results confirm that the
population of female-headed households with children
is economically quite disadvantaged, with an average
real total annual income of $21,000 (in constant 1994
dollars), average earnings of only $11,000, and an inor-near poverty rate of 50 percent. Moreover, AFDC
participants are far more likely to be seriously
economically disadvantaged than nonparticipants.
Among AFDC participants, average total income is
only $11,000, average earnings are only $2,600 and the
in-or-near poverty rate is 88 percent, while among
nonparticipants the average total income is $25,000,
average earnings are only $14,000, and the in-or-near
poverty rate is 36 percent.

Empirical evidence of the effects of such changes is
available from the 1981 AFDC reforms, which sought
to reduce caseloads by restricting limits on earnings and
assets. The 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
(OBRA81), designed to reign in the explosive growth in
caseloads that had occurred over the previous decade,
dramatically altered the treatment of earnings and assets
in the AFDC program. The 1981 Act eliminated the
disregard of one-third of earnings after four months of
work, capped the disregards given by caseworkers for
work expenses and child-care expenses, and imposed
new eligibility restrictions. OBRA81 denied eligibility
to families whose pre-disregard income was over 150
percent of the state need standard and imposed a new
asset limit of $1,000 per family. The overall result of
these changes was that drastically fewer recipients
could maintain eligibility while working, and hence the
work disincentive for AFDC recipients was
significantly increased.
Current state temporary assistance for needy
families (TANF) proposals to expand earnings
disregards and asset limits would directly reverse
several of the federal regulations implemented under
the 1981 Act. This dissel1ation presents an analysis of
the effects of the 1981 welfare reforms on femaleheaded households with children.

After 1981, the average annual AFDC benefit fell 28
percent from $5,600 to $4,000, the average total
income of AFDC participants fell by 19 percent from
$12,000 to $9,700, and the percentage of households in
poverty rose from 66 to 80 percent. In contrast, the real
incomes of nonparticipants stayed roughly constant
over the 1975-1987 period. In addition, new AFDC
entrants after 1981 were more disadvantaged than
entrants before 1981. Their AFDC grants were an
average of 34 percent lower, earnings were 10 percent
lower, total income was 12 percent lower, and their
poverty rate was substantially higher. In contrast, the
population of AFDC exiters after 1981 was at a level of
economic well-being that was roughly equal to the
analogous population before 1981, with the exception
that exiters after 1981 had earnings that were 26
percent higher than those exiting before 1981.
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CHAPTER 2

CHAPTER 3

The results from Chapter 1 suggest a change in the
composition of the caseload of AFDC participants, with
participants after 1981 likely to be even more
disadvantaged than AFDC participants before 1981.
Chapter 2 uses a simple nonparametric approach to
estimate the effects of the 1981 welfare reforms on
AFDC participation, entry and exit rates, spell lengths,
eligibility rates, and participation rates among eligibles.
The results showed striking differences between white
and nonwhite households. Among white households,
the probability of AFDC participation increased from
20 to 22 pcrcent after 1981, while among nonwhite
households it decreased from 42 to 35 percent. The
probability of AFDC entry decreased for both groups,
but thc drop was much larger among nonwhite families
(from 12 to 7 percent of previous-year nonparticipants,
compared to a drop tj'om 6 to 5 pcrcent for white
households). Similarly, the one-year exit rate from
AFDC increased for white households, from 28 to 30
percent of participants, while it decreased for nonwhite
households, from 27 to 23 percent. These patterns of
strong negative effects on the participation of nonwhite
households and weaker positive effects among white
households continuc even after conditioning separately
on age, education, and family size.

Chapter 3 develops a formal structural discretechoice model to estimate utility parameters underlying
individual work and welfare choices. Estimates are
derived from a discrete-choice model in which female
heads choose among six welfare/work combinations:
on versus off welfare, together with zero, half-time, or
full-time work. The estimation is complicated by kinks
in the budget constraint that arise from the loss of
welfare benefits at higher income levels, the interaction
of the AFDC and Food Stamps programs, and the
progressivity of the federal tax system.

The results suggest that, at least among nonwhite
households, AFDC participation became increasingly
concentrated in the lower tail of the potential-earnings
distribution. Although not statistically significant,
some evidence was also found that AFDC spell lengths
increased somewhat after 1981, consistent with a
change in the composition of the AFDC caseload
toward less-skilled, lower earning households.
AFDC eligibility rates among female-headed
households declined significantly after 1981, even after
conditioning separately on age, education, race, and
family size. Because eligibility is based on earnings
and assets and is hence essentially endogenous, this
result shows little evidence of households dramatically
reducing labor supply or divesting assets in order to
retain eligibility. This is also consistent with an
increasing concentration of participants in the lower tail
of the potential-earnings distribution.
Finally, AFDC participation rates conditional on
eligibility increased significantly after 1981, suggesting
that rather than discouraging participation among
eligibles, the lower benefits and tighter eligibility
standards imposed in 1981 refocused participation onto
the households most likely to find that the benefits of
AFDC participation outweighed the costs.
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Since the joint work/welfare choice affects the shape
of the budget constraint, two budget constraints must be
evaluated for each household, one with AFDC benefits
and one without. The discrete-choice approach to
modeling labor supply simplifies this problem
considerably, since it reduces the number of points at
which each budget constraint must be evaluated. This
approach avoids the need to calculate the location of
each kink point for the two budget constraints faced by
each household. Furthermore, discretizing the laborsupply decision allows the problem to be cast as a
standard discrete-choice problem with different work!
welfare combinations as alternatives. A cost of this
discrete-choice approach is the inability to capture
marginal changes in labor supply that may occur as a
result of welfare.
A problem faced by recent structural studies of work
and welfare is the lack of a tractable analytic solution to
the welfare/work choice problem characterized by
heterogeneity in preferences. Revealed-preference
inequalities in the model specified here arc solved
analytically, and the model is estimated with standard
maximum-likelihood techniques.
The model is estimated on a sample of 2,462 PSID
female heads-of-household over the years 1978 to
1984. The changes imposed by the 1981 OBRA are
accounted for explicitly in the budget set, as are
changes in the federal tax system and the interaction of
AFDC and Food Stamps. Also accounted for is a
concurrent erosion in real benefit levels that occurred as
states failed to increase benefits at the rate of inflation.
Once estimated, parameters are substituted into the
utility function to predict the response of each
individual in the sample to a new policy environment.
This technique is uscd to disentangle the multiple
effects of the 1981 reforms and to predict responses to
new policy changes.
The findings show that the higher benefit-reduction
rate imposed by OBRA81 had a large negative effect on
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labor-force participation among AFDC recipients.
Restricted eligibility rules had little effect on
participants but a positive effect on the labor supply of
women newly ineligible for AFDC. Eroding real
benefit standards had a large negative effect on AFDC
participation, resulting in a large positive effect on the
labor supply of women leaving AFDC.
Estimated utility parameters were also used to
simulate the effects of hypothetical policy changes.
AFDC participation and labor-supply choices were
predicted to be unresponsive to changes in needs
standards. However, both choices were responsive to
changes in payment standards. Higher wages
decreased AFDC participation, resulting in a large
effect on the labor supply of AFDC exiters. But the
effect of higher wages on the labor supply of recipients
was predicted to be small, at least in the absence of
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higher disregards to match the higher earnings. The net
effect of higher wages was to increase the labor supply
among female heads.
Perhaps most relevant for states considering new
reforms is the prediction that manipulation of the
benefit-reduction rate induces significant, offsetting
changes in both AFDC participation and work effort by
recipients. Lower benefit-reduction rates encourage
work effort among recipients, but much of this work
effort comes from new women drawn onto the rolls
who would have worked even more off of AFDC.
Accounting for this effect on labor supply, the net
response of aggregate labor supply of female heads to
the benefit-reduction rate is small. Finally, lower
benefit-reduction rates also significantly increase
expenditures on benefits, as more women move onto
AFDC.
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